party alliance (e.g., 3Com). More often, Xerox looked for ways to exit gracefully from businesses that had become strategically unimportant to its core businesses. With the passage of time and the benefit of hindsight, though, such a reasonable strategy appears to have overlooked the potential value of Xerox's technology for uses in new businesses. These other possible applications, however, were difficult to foresee, because they often diverged sharply from the company's current pursuits. Moreover, they required years of work and significant changes to their business plans before yielding any tangible rewards.
Xerox's difficulties in realizing the potential value of its technologies from these spin-off companies also indicate the role of internal mechanisms for connecting discovery-oriented research with profitseeking development. Xerox defined its research process as a veryearly-stage activity, geared to initial discovery and exploration of new phenomena. Researchers were not chartered to translate their findings into practical applications. Thus, research projects "finished" while technologies were still nascent. At the same time, Xerox defined its development process as an applied activity, allowing only a short interval before a product reached the market. This approach discouraged Xerox from funding activities that required the company to create new businesses. While this procedure allowed technologies to be created in research and transferred by development effectively within the copier and printer businesses, other technologies were created in research that had no apparent marketable value. Xerox lacked procedures to identify and transform these technologies into salable products in new business areas.
Xerox Research and "the Architecture of Information"
In 1969, Xerox chief executive Peter McColough commissioned Jacob Goldman, who was then the head of research at Xerox, to build a new laboratory within the corporate research organization to provide the company with the technology necessary to realize McColough's vision of "the architecture of information." McColough's idea was that Xerox would transcend its current business of being the leading office copier company to become the leading office equipment supplier of information-intensive products. Goldman, in turn, assigned Xerox scientist George Pake the task of creating this research organization. Pake received his assignment at a fortuitous time, when government re-would not be captured, but this outcome was viewed as a necessary cost of fundamental research.8 The underlying premise was that Xerox would find a way to harness a sufficiently large portion of the results of these investigations, so that the return to the corporation would greatly exceed the costs of doing the research.
To manage the risk of incurring enormous expenditures in the pursuit of this ambitious mission, Xerox carefully circumscribed the scope of the research effort. Development work was considered to be far more expensive than basic research, so any efforts to develop discoveries made in the lab for commercial purposes were restricted.9 Research managers accepted this mandate, as they considered development work to be less technically inventive.'o Goldman later wrote that in a large company, where "responsibilities are compartmentalized," the technical side of the house, which is "often the research and development laboratory," works in an insulated environment. He went on to comment that the barrier works both ways: "it impedes the transfer of new technology to the operating groups, and impedes the flow of market information to the technical people.""
In the early years of PARC's operation, this limitation did not figure prominently in its day-to-day operations.'2 Pake managed McColough's expectations effectively, telling him that it would require ten years for the investment in PARC to show material benefits to the corporation. 13 As Xerox attempted to digest the SDS acquisition, it began to plan to introduce products that would incorporate PARC technologies. PARC researchers perceived that Xerox corporate managers were largely satisfied with PARC's contributions.14 However, the 1970s proved to be a turbulent period for Xerox's primary business in copiers. At the beginning of the decade, Xerox was quite The antitrust investigation and its subsequent resolution distracted Xerox management from the research activities underway at PARC. Some PARC researchers, in turn, began to see greater opportunities for their ideas outside Xerox. In 1979, employees began to leave Xerox in order to commercialize the technology in their own companies. By 1998, thirty-five new companies had been created.
Given the many research activities underway throughout Xerox's five research centers,16 it is necessary to define a "technology spin-off organization" and to outline the research methodology I used to recover information on these firms.7 I defined a technology spin-off firm as one that satisfies three conditions: The technology was initiated or pursued for at least one year's time within a Xerox research center. At least one Xerox researcher left, along with the technology, to become an employee of the new company. The entity that received the technology and the researcher was separated from Xerox and incorporated into a new legal entity and did not necessarily receive Xerox's assent to create a new company.
To organize this account, I have grouped spin-off company activities into four distinct policy phases between 1979 and 1998, based on the parallel evolution of Xerox's corporate strategic direction and the activities of the spin-offs themselves. This account will discuss a couple of illustrative companies that exemplify procedural aspects of each period, report summarily on the remaining spin-offs, and conclude with some general observations. Characteristics of the thirty-five companies are briefly noted in Table 1 17To understand the processes that led to the formation of these firms, I sought to interview participants within both Xerox and the spin-off firms. To manage the inherent problems with retrospective recall and self-serving representations of events, I tried to uncover contemporaneous evidence of the ventures from public sources. Armed with these aids to memory, I interviewed respondents. I attempted to cross-check accounts of events with multiple respondents and omitted information that could not be verified with a second respondent. However, some selective memory and bias nonetheless remain in this account. While corporate management girded for war in the copier sector, some West Coast researchers became uneasy about Xerox's continued commitment to capitalize on their work. Sensing the latent potential in their own discoveries and realizing how distracted their corporate management had become by problems in the copier business, more researchers departed from PARC. As research management, in turn, began to support projects of direct, immediate value to the company, it used spin-offs to create graceful exits for research that no longer seemed useful to Xerox.
An important defining event of this new period was Bill Spencer's promotion to run Xerox PARC in 1983. Spencer had joined Xerox in 1981 to set up and manage one of their integrated-circuit fabrication facilities and then went on to become manager of one of the laboratories within PARC. Spencer was convinced that part of the job of research was the transfer of its technological discoveries to its "customers," the product development groups.29 He also had to weigh the shifting Xerox corporate direction against the needs of his research staff. This balancing had to be done delicately. He was aware of the importance of treating researchers well. He felt that firing certain researchers would send a powerfully negative message through the division and diminish the ability of PARC to recruit excellent researchers in the future.
However, some research projects were no longer critical to Xerox as it conducted its retreat from the computer marketplace. Spencer viewed spin-off organizations as one graceful way to end research support for these projects. He helped individual researchers transfer their projects outside the company, often allowing them to take equipment they had used at Xerox with them.30 In this way, he attempted to redirect PARC's staff toward work that was more closely aligned with Xerox's copier and printer businesses without alienating the researchers.31
The laissez-faire attitude toward spin-off organizations had changed at Xerox. Instead, spin-offs were now viewed as useful, provided that they served a strategic purpose for the company. The case for each 29 Hiltzik, Dealers of Lightning, 377. 30 In particular, both Komag and SynOptics were able to take much of their lab equipment with them. In each case, some money was paid back to Xerox later for the equipment, but the ability to have immediate use of the equipment was beneficial to both companies.
31 Despite Spencer's efforts, some research staff were alienated, particularly after Spencer forced the departure of Robert Taylor from PARC. Taylor, who had been at PARC as an assistant director since its early days, had been a strong and effective proponent of a researchdriven approach within PARC. Spencer's agenda to bridge the divide between research and development conflicted in many ways with Taylor's. (See Hiltzik, Dealers ofLightning, 1999.) spin-off had to be justified at the highest organizational levels within Xerox before the process of separation was allowed to proceed. Xerox also began to take an equity interest in its spin-offs, in return for licensing its intellectual property to the new companies. Strong resistance was developing to letting researchers depart on their own initiative, as they had done in the first phase. One manifestation of this shift in attitude was Spencer's rule of "no additional invested capital." Spencer did not want to encourage researchers to leave, so he mandated that Xerox would not put additional money into a spin-off company. The fledgling enterprise would have to raise funds on its own, if it could.32
This rule was designed to reduce the moral hazard facing Xerox researchers with promising technology. If researchers felt that Xerox might be willing to provide financial support to a company that had been generated by their technology research, they might be encouraged to intensify their efforts in order to increase the chances of creating a spin-off. This could compromise their efforts to perform their primary task, which was to develop technologies for use within Xerox's current businesses. Under Spencer's rule, researchers who were tempted to leave could expect no financial help from Xerox. This reduced the temptation to create technologies expressly for spin-off commercialization. While this rule may have diminished the number of researchers working on technologies designed primarily to form the basis of new ventures, it came at a cost. The "no new funds" rule also precluded Xerox from participating in the financial success of its offshoots, beyond whatever interest it could secure for its intellectual property.
Although Spectra Diode Labs (SDL) formally evolved from PARC prior to Spencer's promotion to the head of PARC, its separation exemplified the new approach Xerox adopted toward managing its progeny in this second phase. Moreover, Spencer had been deeply involved in orchestrating the spin-off before taking over PARC, and his positive experience with SDL influenced his later policies toward these newly created companies in the second phase. In this second phase, Xerox utilized spin-offs to manage strategic exits from internal technology efforts. In all these cases, Xerox received an equity stake in return for licensing its technology to the venture. Xerox invested little or no additional money in these companies, however, so its resulting equity stake in each new enterprise tended to be small. Despite Xerox's partial ownership, there was evidence of internal resistance to these spin-offs, particularly to SynOptics and ParcPlace. With the notable exception of SynOptics, which had the largest early revenues of any company in this sample, the revenues of these spin-off companies did not grow to the level achieved by the companies formed during the first phase. SynOptics grew most rapidly, reaching $700 million in its ninth year. Spectra-Diode Laboratories, by contrast, did not achieve revenues of $50 million, even in its tenth year, nor did ParcPlace or most of the other spin-offs from this phase. The intention of XTV was to align Xerox's incentives with those of the spin-offs and to employ venture capital processes to create value for its peripheral technologies. If there were promising technologies within Xerox that were not being utilized in Xerox's businesses, XTV provided a new path for them to enter the market. If that technology subsequently created significant economic value, XTV's investment enabled Xerox to participate substantially in the resultant value. As Kearns stated in 1993, "XTV is a hedge against the repeated missteps of the past."40 Armed with this new structure and the charter to hunt for commercial possibilities within Xerox's technology portfolio, Adams and his partners began reviewing the company's inventions. The first opportunity they uncovered was Advanced Workstation Products (AWP). Xerox's high-end printers actually were complex computer systems that contained extensive networking connections. However, these internal computers were expensive because they were built with proprietary components, a manifestation of Xerox's approach to systems design. The development costs of these proprietary components had to be borne by the low unit volumes of its printers, in contrast to industrystandard parts costs that could be spread over large volumes. Tony Domit, vice president of a network business unit, began developing a method that used off-the-shelf components to perform the Xerox networked printer-controller functions. Domit's solution used an IBM personal computer, some special chips, and a controller board to emulate the functions of the Xerox system. As Domit recalled, "The [Xerox proprietary] approach was costing around $15K and our approach was less than $1500oo, not including the IBM PC."41 Domit's low-cost, "not invented here" system generated friction with internal Xerox units that were developing new extensions to their proprietary solutions. The internal development organization felt that an off-the-shelf solution would never perform well enough to substitute for its proprietary technology. This belief had frustrated Domit's ability to advance his inexpensive, informal approach within Xerox.
Under the sponsorship of Adams, and armed with funding from XTV, Domit got the opportunity to develop his strategy outside Xerox's internal development units. Domit became the CEO of AWP, which gave him the resources to turn the print-controller system that he had designed into a final product. XTV invested $3.5 million and received 80 percent of the equity in the company. Becoming independent also gave the start-up organization the freedom to compete head-on with the internal Xerox development units in Rochester. To their surprise, Domit's group was able to raise the controller's performance to the level of the proprietary Xerox system-at one-fifth the cost.42 This price performance breakthrough gave Xerox a strategic benefit, reducing the costs of its high-end printers. Subsequently, in January 1991, one and a half years after AWP was incorporated, Xerox bought the company back for $15 million. Domit and other AWP employees, who had received a 20 percent equity stake in the new company, now profited handsomely from their work. Furthermore, the XTV partners received roughly $2.5 million from the transaction. Certain Xerox managers, who did not wish to be identified, regarded XTV's compensation as grossly excessive relative to the time and effort the partners had invested in AWP.43 XTV's third investment, Documentum, proved to be its primary money-maker. Documentum was a company formed as a direct result of the strategic intent of XTV. Xerox had done extensive research on document management, but none of the projects had resulted in new products or services. To be sure, some project results had filtered into Xerox's printers and copiers, but only as individual components of a larger system. Robert Adams considered that the PARC document-management solutions offered pivotal know-how that could open doors for Xerox's high-end networked laser printers, while producing an outstanding business opportunity. Adams invited Howard Shao and John Newton to come to PARC and canvass its current research on document management, with a view to identifying a potential spin-off. Shao and Newton had both worked together at Ingres, a database software company. Shao had been a member of one other startup company and had spent some time at CitiCorp. The two men spent about six months talking with researchers at PARC. Much of that time was occupied with interviewing prospective customers who had significant problems with document management. For example, a pharmaceutical company that was applying for FDA approval had to manage hundreds of documents that 42 "A Walk in the PARC," Economist, to July 1993, 68. 43 heard many charges and accusations made "off the record," and generally, exclude such criticisms from this account. I include this one for two reasons: first, that it was made by three separate individuals at different stages of the research; and two, it foreshadowed the later decision to terminate the XTV structure, despite its financial success. This last decision is difficult to understand, absent these sentiments. ran into tens of thousands of pages. As Shao said later, "Xerox PARC had all of the pieces to implement a document management solution. They just didn't know what to do with the pieces, and how to put them together."44 Documentum was formed in January 1990, and XTV took an initial 80 percent stake in the company. Beyond the founders' systematic and thorough approach to marketing, the Xerox association was critical to the startup's success for two reasons: it gave them direct access to customers who were interested in their intended products, and it gave them credibility with those customers.45 However, Documentum's products were designed to work with IBM systems and with those of other high-end systems suppliers, as well as those of Xerox. This compatibility with such systems was inconsistent with Xerox's preferred strategy to develop and sell complete Xerox solutions. It also required Documentum to rewrite all the software code, in order to create products that were compatible with IBM and other third-party hardware.
With subsequent rounds of financing, XTV's ownership percentage declined. This was the only XTV spin-off that was syndicated to outside venture investors. By January 1996, Documentum had its initial public offering, creating a market value of $323 million at the end of the first day of trading. It would prove to be the most successful investment of all the XTV companies. Even though Xerox's share had declined to 38 percent by the time of the IPO, its stake at the end of the first day of trading amounted to $1o6 million, the largest financial return to Xerox made by any of the spin-offs described in this study. Xerox then progressively sold off its holdings in Documentum once it became public. Despite XTV's tremendous financial success with Documentum, the venture nonetheless had its critics within Xerox. One senior research manager felt that Documentum had "stolen" some of PARC's best work. He believed that much of Documentum's success had been achieved through sales to Xerox's top corporate accounts by Xerox's own sales force at the expense of other Xerox products. PARC researcher Richard Bruce, who had been leading the project since 1989, became president of the group, which started with about thirty full-time "consultants." The group had already completed twelve preproduction LiveBoard units by the time it officially became LiveWorks in August 1992. However, it faced significant challenges, including the lack of a viable manufacturing plan and significant cost overruns.
An outside CEO was brought in to replace Bruce once the venture was formally launched as an independent entity. The company continued to struggle to meet its costs and to supply LiveBoards of acceptable quality. Despite reaching revenues of $14 million, the company continued to incur significant financial losses. By 1996, the outside CEO had 
XTV's Performance and Its Termination
By 1996, the XTV pool of $30 million committed in 1989 had returned a total of $219 million to Xerox, after fees and profit sharing with the general partners at XTV, according to one calculation. This represented an internal rate of return exceeding 56 percent, which compared very favorably with the 13.7 percent average rate of return from other independent venture capital funds that started in 1989.48 By any reasonable standard, XTV had been a tremendous financial success for Xerox. The XTV portfolio derived its returns primarily from two successful ventures: Documentum's revenues exceeded $120 million in its seventh year of operation, while Document Sciences earned close to $20 million during the same period. These gains more than covered the losses from other XTV investments. XTV succeeded because it relied on methods adopted by successful ventures and bypassed Xerox's internal processes. By contrast, LiveWorks, CTI, and Xerox ColorgrafX, which did not utilize XTV's approach, went nowhere. XTV also enabled Xerox to own a larger share of the ventures and thus to reap more of the profits when they succeeded.
Yet, despite this performance, Xerox elected to terminate the fund in 1996. This decision was a puzzling one, and the reasons for it have been difficult to unravel. One issue was the autonomy accorded Adams and the XTV principals. Some senior Xerox managers felt that this independence compromised the ability to develop strategic ties between 47 Some of the facts surrounding the failure of LiveWorks were unavailable to me because of the terms of a settlement of a lawsuit between Xerox and three of the outside professional managers (which did not include Bruce) of the failed venture. 48 The assumptions behind these calculations are detailed in Josh Lerner, "Xerox Technology Ventures: January 1997 Teaching Note," Harvard Business School case no. 5-298-152, 1998. They assume that XTV liquidated its position at the end of the first day of public trading for Documentum and Document Sciences. the spin-off technologies and Xerox's internal businesses. Once the technologies were diverted into startup companies funded by XTV, the spin-offs treated the Xerox businesses just as they would any other potential customer. There were allegations that some of the success of the most profitable XTV companies, Documentum and Document Sciences, came partially at the expense of Xerox products. The rate of return earned by XTV took no account of this potential lost business to Xerox. Indeed, the XTV structure and its incentive systems assigned no value to fostering synergy with Xerox's own businesses.
While these are plausible critiques of the XTV structure, one suspects that there were additional reasons for the decision to terminate the fund. These incentive issues were obvious from the outset, yet Xerox nonetheless chose to proceed with XTV. Xerox managers' envy of the wealth accrued by Adams and his two partners may have been another reason.49 XTV capitalized on technologies that were available to internal Xerox businesses, and XTV's success might have made the internal units look bad by comparison. The penchant for autonomy by XTV and the prior history of resistance to spin-offs in the Xerox culture in general probably added fuel to the fire and continued to be an issue well after the events of the third phase.
A final contributory factor in the demise of XTV was that its financial success may not have directly translated into gains for Xerox's shareholders. The earnings through Documentum and Document Sciences, for example, might have been discounted by financial analysts as "one-time gains" or nonrecurring items. Such one-time gains may not have yielded much to Xerox's shareholders. Possibly Xerox needed an additional financial mechanism to convert revenue from its spin-offs into equity gains for its shareholders.
The Aftermath of XTV's Dissolution: Xerox New Enterprise
Although Xerox terminated its XTV structure, it remained interested in managing spin-offs in order to profit from its technology. It soon began to set up a new and different process to evaluate technologies for commercialization, including the creation of new businesses. This time, the creation of synergy with Xerox's own businesses was of paramount concern. Rafik Loufty, then vice president of corporate 49 Under two scenarios of returns to Xerox after partners' fees, one from Lerner (see above) of $219 million, and the second from Adams's claim of $300 million, the three XTV partners would have received between $55 and $75 million as their portion of the returns from for the six years they spent with the fund. In addition, they would have collectively received 2 percent of the fund each year for salary and administration. research and development, recounts how in 1996 he began to look for ways that the corporation could commercialize its software and solutions technology. After asking the question, "How should we parse the $1 billion we have in R&D?," he elaborated: "At that time, there was no path for our technology to get to market. We felt that our business groups did not have the capability, nor the complementarity with their current businesses to adequately assess these technologies on their own."50
The new process that the company came up with examined promising technologies and offered them first to the business units. One impetus was to speed up the time it took for a product to leave the lab and reach the marketplace. A new aspect of this review was that the business units had nine months either to commit themselves to or decide against adoption of these technologies. "Adoption" meant that the business units would take over their subsequent funding and development. Prior to this mechanism, business units could only express interest in a technology. This meant that the research unit had to continue to develop the technology without a firm commitment to its subsequent deployment. Research managers at Xerox felt that a procedure was necessary to avoid this delay, to move technologies out to the market.51
The new process started by identifying and selecting technologies that had matured to the point where their eventual commercial path could be evaluated. These projects were aggregated and screened. The final selections were evaluated, and of these, only some were commercialized outside the company.
The for the spinout to be a supplier to Xerox later on. And of course, (4) we don't commercialize it, and instead keep it in the labs.52
Promising candidates were given seed funding for assessment of their technical feasibility and potential market value. This phase might last an additional three to six months. At the end of that period, the technology was reviewed, with the goal of placing it in one of the four different paths to market.
Xerox established the Xerox New Enterprise (XNE) Board as a holding company of internally funded ventures and a place for incubating technology and business projects that did not fit comfortably inside the Xerox corporate structure but held promise for the company's longterm strategy. The president of XNE reported to the CFO of Xerox. XNE was designed to combine the power of the Xerox Corporation with the entrepreneurial environment of a startup. Mark Myers explained that Xerox would maintain "at least 50% ownership of these quasiindependent entities." He pointed at that "the employees of these companies are thinking as entrepreneurs, not as Xerox employees," and thus are not particularly interested in being reacquired by Xerox at some later date. Nor did Xerox want to buy back all the businesses. "We would only want to buy back the good ones, and valuations are high these days."53 XNE was structured to provide access to corporate resources without imposing corporate structure. Following the model constructed by Thermo Electron, XNE provided legal, financial, and strategic services to the businesses in its portfolio and charged a low percentage of revenue for these services.54 While Xerox owned, funded, and managed the XNE companies, each was legally distinct from the parent corporation. XNE employees were not Xerox employees, and any Xerox personnel that joined an XNE company had to resign from the parent company. While salaries of XNE companies were comparable to those in Xerox, the benefits packages varied. Perhaps most important, up to 20 percent of the stock in each XNE company was reserved for managers and employees. In June 1996, Chrystal Software, which had created the document management software application called Astoria, became the first business to be moved out of Xerox's XSoft unit into XNE. The Astoria application broke down documents as objects and could distinguish between "boiler plate" and custom components. This functionality was marketed to large corporations, such as insurance and manufacturing companies, as well as to other traditional Xerox customers. Though Astoria had modest sales while it was still an XSoft product, no Xerox divisions were interested in supporting the Astoria software product line.
Xerox retained 80 percent of the company's equity. The first CEO of Chrystal was Steven Kiser, who had most recently served as XSoft's president and had previously performed various strategic and general management roles inside Xerox. By the time Chrystal was spun off in June 1996, it already had an installed base of about thirty systems. Chrystal found some aspects of XNE management beneficial, as it was not forced to face the fiscal challenges that "normal startups" typically confront. In Kiser's words, "We didn't have to look for cash, and could essentially ignore issues like making payroll," which often preoccupied management of more traditional startup ventures. Furthermore, they would be able to utilize Xerox's marketing and sales organizations to sell their product, and they also inherited additional promising software products from Xerox.
As operations under XNE oversight evolved, however, Kiser and his team saw that there were also tradeoffs in the arrangement: First, by having to negotiate their annual budgets many months in advance, they lost some operational flexibility, reducing their ability to respond to unforeseen issues and opportunities. Second, Kiser felt that the small organization had no leverage over the Xerox marketing and sales forces and could not motivate it to sell the Astoria software with Xerox's mainline products. Finally, Kiser felt the processes XNE followed to foster synergy with Xerox's businesses were not appropriate for Chrystal: "There's a huge gap between Xerox corporate strategy and our needs. Software companies have to work at the speed of light because things are changing so fast. This isn't possible under strict Xerox oversight."55 Under Bruce, the company recruited an outside marketing consultant and interacted with potential customers such as Hewlett-Packard and third parties like Sun and its JavaSoft group to identify applications for their technology. This proved to be challenging, both inside and outside of Xerox, because the technology was ahead of its time. Outside parties, though impressed with the technology, were unable to envision specific applications. In the words of Xerox researcher Bob Kravacic, it was "a platform in search of an application."s7 Within Xerox, management did not consider it to be a strategic technology.
In June 1996, Bruce pitched a plan to CIC that featured a Xerox minority share and the inclusion of outside capital and know-how. CIC approved the plan and assigned Andrew Garman to negotiate with outside investors. Garman succeeded in bringing in two private individual investors, Rick Magnuson and Kanwal Rekhi, for a seed round, and PlaceWare was spun off in November 1996. PlaceWare was unique among the Xerox offshoots of this period in that Xerox did not have oversight and held only a minority equity position. One year after it was established, Richard Bruce, PlaceWare's initial CEO, returned to PARC. In 1997, the company brought in an outside CEO, Barry Folsom, to run the company. In that same year, the company had its first venture round at a $15 million valuation.
The other XNE spin-offs are shown in Table 1 . One of them, Xerox Engineering Systems, has aggregated Xerox's large-format printing businesses for engineering and architectural applications. These businesses, initially acquired from Versatec, have developed within Xerox over the course of many years. The company is rumored to be planning an IPO for the near future. Another firm, Inxight, has raised some outside equity funding and may eventually go public as well. There are also suggestions that XNE's processes have not enabled its ventures to adapt to new opportunities and issues as rapidly as needed. Capital infusions are tied to the annual budget cycle and are inflexible between cycles. XNE's reporting and governance relations are more typical of corporate hierarchies than of venture companies. While it has mimicked particular corporate processes found in the ThermoElectron model, the XNE structure has neglected the attribute that infused external market discipline and oversight into the ThermoElectron companies: the public listing of stock in each venture.s8 The procedures that XNE utilizes must continue to evolve if they are to foster the development of new businesses for Xerox.
Conclusion
One implication to be derived from this history is that researchdriven companies cannot continue to rely on the processes they have in 58 The commitment to publicly list the spin-off requires that the spin-off have sufficient size and momentum to qualify for listing, and be able to survive as a public entity. By contrast, XNE is spinning off early stage technologies into companies that, with the single exception of XES, are years away from qualifying for an IPO. For more on Thermo Electron's approach, see Allen, "Capital Markets and Corporate Structure." place for connecting research products with current businesses, in order to nurture new business ventures. Xerox's research investments in the Architecture of Information led to potentially promising technologies that lacked a direct connection to its core businesses. This caused Xerox to form a number of spin-off companies. Xerox's current business was able to benefit from some of its offshoots. In three instancesAdvanced Workstation Products, Xerox ColorGraphX, and Xerox Engineering Systems-Xerox acted to retain the technologies created by the new companies and incorporate them into its main products. Xerox was able to lower the production costs of its laser diode components through its formation of Spectra Diode Labs, and its standardization of Ethernet via 3Com led to lower costs and greater configuration flexibility in its own copiers and printers. Xerox's focus on its current businesses seems to have caused Xerox management to discount revenues and financial gains in new areas. Even in situations where a spin-off company achieved a significant financial return for Xerox, Xerox managers still were often critical if that return was realized without any perceived benefit to the main businesses of the company. This disapproval manifested itself during the formation of SynOptics and intensified during the period when the XTV companies, such as AWP, Documentum, Document Sciences, and even the XTV fund itself, were being established. Instead of building on the success of these ventures and on their ability to expand into new business areas, Xerox disbanded these efforts and sold off their equity interests.
Generally, both spin-off participants and Xerox executives felt that the corporate strategic imperatives of Xerox's current businesses outweighed Xerox's goal of generating new businesses. As one manager who participated in two of the spin-offs put it:
And at the end of the day, even if things do go well for the spin-off, with the right incentives and the company survives and makes it, you get a $20 million company. This is a rounding error for Xerox. Moreover, Xerox doesn't benefit directly by the market cap of the company, they really only benefit from revenues and earnings, so they even play by a different set of financial rules from the VCs [venture capitalists]. So for Xerox, the key has to be how to leverage the Big House, the printing engine, vs. seeding the next 3Com.59
Xerox chief technology officer Mark Myers agreed, noting that, as a $20 billion company Xerox needs "to add $2-3 billion in new revenues every year." He commented that the typical payout of $10-$50 million from a successful spinout wouldn't "make a dent," and he concluded: "We just can't meet our growth goals using these spinout mechanisms.'"6o the combined value of these emergent companies exceeded that of Xerox itself, and it continued to do so from 1999 onward. Myers's perspective was correct in the short term: it took many years for spin-off companies to generate significant revenues and "make a dent" in Xerox's growth goals. However, with the passage of additional time, these new ventures generated significant revenues and earnings, yielding a market value greater than that of Xerox itself. Over time, these ventures could indeed "make a dent" in Xerox's growth. While Xerox did participate financially in a few of these companies, such as SynOptics, Documentum, and Document Sciences, its financial return overall is very small in relation to the market value, as shown in Figure 1 . The market value reflects not only the potential that resided in Xerox's technology, but also the importance of developing processes to create new markets for that technology. Indeed, Xerox could have managed its spin-offs as a portfolio and relied on external venture capital to administer these companies. While any individual spin-off would likely fail, a few might perform well and become significant companies. Xerox's risk would be limited to its initial investment, while its rewards would be unbounded. Thus, such a portfolio of spin-offs could be regarded as a series of "real options."61 Instead of looking to them primarily for near term revenue that would be incremental to the current business, the spin-offs could be managed as long-term options on new future markets. This would free the spin-offs from the tyranny of supporting only the existing businesses and could provide Xerox with a platform for building future businesses.
Xerox's graceful exits thus may have led to lost opportunities. This history suggests that Xerox's managers may have erred by expecting to derive profit from the company's research that would apply only to its current businesses. This has caused Xerox to forfeit chances to participate in the creation of new businesses that utilized this research. The data in Figure 1 suggest that Xerox therefore missed out on important sources of new value creation.
In some respects, the challenges of the business environment have significantly intensified since Xerox's first spin-off companies were created in 1979. Venture capital has swelled to enormous proportions relative to its size at that time. The labor mobility of skilled technical personnel has increased, so keeping talented researchers has become more difficult. Even highly specialized Ph.D. graduates are eschewing careers at research laboratories, choosing instead to commercialize technology through startup companies. What proved challenging for Xerox through most of the period from 1979 through 1998 was also troubling afterward.
Thus, Xerox's experience managing its spin-offs may serve as a cautionary tale to other firms that conduct discovery-oriented internal research. It is likely that all research-driven companies will find themselves-at least occasionally-with technologies that lack a clear path to the market within the companies' current businesses. Such technologies cannot simply be kept "on the shelf' until the day when the company is ready to make use of them. Today, all research-oriented companies operate in the shadow of venture capital, with the resulting external options for people and technology that this implies. These outside opportunities increase the pressure upon the research-driven firm to deploy the technology itself or risk seeing it developed elsewhere without any benefit for the firm that funded the research.
The history of Xerox has important implications for the organization of basic, discovery-oriented research. If a company restricts itself to utilizing only the results that support its current business, the day will inevitably come when that business matures and declines. In order to sustain a strong, long-term commitment to basic research, companies must learn to develop new businesses from the seeds of their research efforts. If they cannot do so, they will be unable to sustain their research efforts beyond the life of their current businesses.
This history also suggests that the processes that companies will need to nurture such enterprises will differ greatly from the methods they employ to manage their current businesses. Instead of trying to align resources with current customers and markets, companies will have to establish procedures for promoting experimentation in new areas. This account further suggests that some of the venture capital methods that are employed for commercializing startups may be relevant to such a task. Companies will have to devise strategies for halting investment in failing experiments and for channeling additional resources in a timely way to experiments that are succeeding. These issues are sure to figure prominently in the pursuit of economies of scope during the next era in industrial research.
